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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, : Case No. 20030471 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's sole support for the reliability of fingerprint evidence rests on the 
fallacious argument that fingerprints have been admitted in courts without any scientific 
basis for over 100 years. This argument ignores the threshold question of whether the 
assumptions underlying fingerprint evidence are even true. Contrary to the State's 
claims, Utah courts have not addressed this question. Further, the State fails to meet its 
burden of proving admissibility given the lack of research on fingerprint identification. 
In any event, the State's failure to present any evidence linking the fingerprint to the time 
that the crime occurred provided insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Quintana beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Regardless of the adequacy of the evidence, the trial judge erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass because the 
evidence was consistent with Mr. Quintana's theory that he could have entered the house 
at anytime during a 30-year period without any intent to commit theft. 
I. REGARDLESS OF THE TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY, 
THE STATE CANNOT OVERCOME THE ABSENCE OF 
RESEARCH ON THE RELIABILITY OF FINGERPRINT 
EVIDENCE AND ITS SOLE RELIANCE ON 100-YEAR 
OLD MYTHS ABOUT THAT EVIDENCE. 
The State's discussion of the test for admitting fingerprint evidence is unavailing 
because, under any test, fingerprint evidence has never been shown to be reliable. The 
State simply repeats the unproven assumptions that other courts have relied on for over 
100 years. No court or research, including any Utah court, has established the reliability 
of fingerprint evidence. Using that evidence to support a criminal conviction amounts to 
guesswork in defiance of the high standards required for a criminal conviction under our 
constitutional form of government. 
A. In The Absence of Any Testing, Fingerprint Evidence is 
Inadmissible Under Any Reliability Standard of Evidence. 
Regardless of which standard applies for admitting fingerprint evidence, the State 
failed to establish reliability under Rule of Evidence 702. The State concedes that State 
v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, Tf40, 27 P.3d 1115, creates "confusion" over whether the 
Rimmasch test applies to fingerprint evidence. State's Brief at 12. Nevertheless, 
because Mthe scientific principles underlying" fingerprint evidence have never been 
shown to be "inherently reliable,"1 fingerprints are not admissible under either the 
reliability prong of the Rimmasch test or the general reliability test for established 
scientific techniques. State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, TJ16, 5 P.3d 642 (quoting State v. 
2 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989)). 
Further, Mr. Quintana correctly raises the principles articulated in Rimmasch and 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). Although 
fingerprint evidence is not novel in the sense that courts have used it for decades, the 
absence of empirical research places fingerprint identification in the same position as 
new scientific theories that have undergone little or no testing. Moreover, Rimmasch and 
Daubert expose the fallacies behind the assumptions underlying the supposed reliability 
of fingerprint identification. Thus, the analyses in those cases of "the scientific 
principles underlying" fingerprint identification directly apply here. Adams, 2000 UT 
42,TJ16,5P.3d642. 
Instead of addressing the absence of research on the reliability of fingerprint 
evidence, the State relies on the only argument cited by other courts in admitting 
fingerprint evidence-that courts have admitted fingerprint evidence for over 100 years. 
State's Brief at 7-8, 13-15; see Appellant's Brief at 32-39 (citing cases relying primarily 
on United States v. Haward, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affirmed on same 
grounds, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)). But, this reasoning simply begs the question of 
whether fingerprint evidence is reliable. Because no research supports the reliability of 
fingerprint identification, such evidence is founded on unproven assumptions. 
The State's arguments essentially rest on the general acceptance theory that this 
Court discarded long ago. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980). Under 
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modern theory for admitting scientific evidence, although "there will usually be no 
reason to reject" widespread acceptance of scientific principles, the ultimate test for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence is its "inherent reliability." Id. at 1234-35. 
"Verification of the basic principle and its application through widespread replication 
and practical usage is an appropriate indicium of reliability." Id. at 1233. In contrast, the 
State's repeated contention that courts have admitted fingerprint evidence for decades, 
entirely overlooks its burden of proving the scientific basis and the reliability of 
identifying that evidence. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 393 n.3,407. 
The State further relies on general acceptance in attempting to shift its burden of 
establishing reliability to Mr. Quintana based on "the long acceptance of fingerprint 
evidence...." State's Brief at 16. Not only does the State fail to cite any authority for 
this proposal, but Utah law directly contradicts it. The Utah Supreme Court has 
unmistakably ruled that "the burden is on the party proffering the evidence to 
demonstrate that it has the requisite degree of reliability." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407. 
The State's burden-shifting proposal is simply a disguised reincarnation of the general 
acceptance test. In the absence of any evidence that fingerprint identification is 
"inherently reliable," the State has the burden of first proving the reliability of the 
principles underlying that evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996). 
Mr. Quintana has no duty to disprove the validity of an unproven theory. Id. 
Even if Mr. Quintana had a burden of producing some evidence, he presented 
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numerous grounds for questioning the reliability of fingerprint identification. Contrary 
to the State's contentions, defense counsel elicited that the Salt Lake City Police 
Department's ("SLCPD") Crime Lab employs no standards for identifying fingerprints. 
R. 178: 140-43. Counsel also thoroughly listed the deficiencies in fingerprint 
identification and that it had never been shown to be reliable. Id. at 140-49. And, as 
detailed in the opening brief, the few studies that have been performed show that 
fingerprint identification is a subjective process that is prone to individual interpretation. 
Appellant's Brief at 22-25. Even Officer Kido admitted that human errors occur in 
identifying fingerprints. R. 178: 167-169. 
Mr. Quintana has further established that present theories underlying fingerprint 
identification are scientifically unsound. Because new discoveries are constantly being 
made, "there is a probability factor in even the most carefully structured scientific 
inquiry", including DNA evidence. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (quoting People v. Slone, 
143 Cal.Rptr. 61, 70 (1978)). Because science it always changing, "'seldom is it possible 
to exclude all possible chance for error in human endeavor.'" Ij±_ (quoting Slone, 143 
Cal.Rptr. at 70). Accordingly, "a computation of probabilities not based on scientifically 
established data is inadmissible" under Utah law. IdL. at 1233. 
No known probabilities exist for the misidentification of fingerprint evidence. 
The State and recent court decisions provide no explanation for exempting fingerprint 
evidence from scientific testing, such as probability assessments, determining error rates, 
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establishing minimal standards, and critical peer review. The tradition of admitting 
fingerprint evidence simply illustrates that courts have admitted unproven, speculative 
assumptions for decades. Until science can establish the reliability of fingerprint 
identification, this Court should not admit that evidence. IdL. 
B. Utah Courts Have Not Decided the Challenges 
to Fingerprint Evidence Presented in this 
Appeal, Including the Absence of Scientific 
Testing 
The State erroneously asserts that this Court need not address Mr. Quintana's 
challenges to fingerprint identification because the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
this evidence was reliable in State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 237-238 (Utah 1991). 
State's Brief at 6-8. The State misapplies the holding in that case. In Hamilton. the 
Utah Supreme Court summarily ruled that fingerprint evidence was not analogous to the 
extensive research showing the limited reliability of eyewitness identification evidence: 
Hamilton urges that we . . . treat fingerprint evidence as 
though it is subject to reliability problems similar to those that 
affect eyewitness identification evidence. Science has shown 
eyewitness identification testimony to have inherent weaknesses 
that almost universally are unappreciated by jurors. Fingerprint 
evidence, however, presents no analogous accuracy problems. 
Questions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint 
evidence are fairly obvious and straightforward and are subject 
to complete illumination through cross-examination and jury 
argument. Thus, we find no reason to conclude that fingerprint 
evidence differs from any other circumstantial evidence. The 
jury can weigh it with the rest of the evidence in determining a 
defendant's guilt. 
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Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 237-238. 
Unlike Hamilton, Mr. Quintana has not simply likened fingerprint identification to 
evidence that has undergone rigorous scientific testing. Rather, he focuses on the lack of 
scientific support for the reliability of fingerprint evidence itself Just like the State's and 
other courts' reliance on general acceptance, the Hamilton court simply assumed that 
fingerprint evidence presented "no analogous accuracy problems" IdL at 237. 
Further, only recent testing has discovered significant reliability problems with 
identifying fingerprints. Appellant's Brief at 22-27. Hamilton rested its holding on the 
conclusion that ff[q]uestions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint evidence are 
fairly obvious and straightforward and are subject to complete illumination through 
cross-examination and jury argument." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 237-238. But, since 
Hamilton was decided in 1991, the defense bar has raised new claims and studies that 
undermine the reliability of fingerprint identification. Even the State concedes that 
Hamilton "may not have challenged fingerprint evidence on precisely the same grounds 
that" Mr. Quintana raises on appeal. State's Brief at 7. Hamilton is limited to its facts 
and the arguments presented at the time that case was decided. 
C. The State Failed to Establish the Reliability of 
the Identification in This Case 
Even assuming that there was evidence establishing the reliability of fingerprint 
identification, the State failed to establish the reliability of the identification in this case. 
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Unlike the federal cases that have found the Department of Justice's procedures to be 
reliable, the State presented no evidence that the procedures used by SLCPD's examiners 
are reliable. See United States v. Plaza. 188 F. Supp.2d 549, 566-71 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
The State's failure to satisfy its burden of establishing the reliability of SLCPD's 
procedures provides an independent basis for excluding the identification in this case. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407. 
II. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO CONNECT THE 
FINGERPRINT TO THE TIME OF THE CRIME 
PREVENTED A REASONABLE JURY FROM FINDING 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Under Utah law and the law from most other states, the single latent fingerprint 
found here failed to support the jury's verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt. When 
fingerprint evidence serves as the only evidence of guilt, the State must connect the 
fingerprint to the time the crime occurred. Given the absence of any other evidence, a 
reasonable jury could not have convicted Mr. Quintana without having a reasonable 
doubt about his guilt. 
Hamilton establishes that when fingerprints are the only evidence supporting a 
conviction, the State must show that the fingerprints were left during the time that the 
crime occurred. In that case, Utah Supreme Court described two views of fingerprint 
evidence: 
There are two general approaches to the weight that may be 
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afforded fingerprint evidence. The first, which is based on an 
American Law Reports annotation, views fingerprint 
evidence with skepticism: "To warrant a conviction, the 
fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused must have 
been found in the place where the crime was committed 
under such circumstances that they could only have been 
impressed at the time when the crime was committed." 
Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as 
Evidence, 28 A.L.R.2d §§ 29, at 1154 (1953); see also 
Borumv. United States. 380 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). In addition, where only fingerprint evidence links the 
defendant to the crime, such evidence is insufficient to 
support a conviction. Borum, 380 F.2d at 596-97. 
Some jurisdictions apply a variant of the first approach. 
While purporting to follow the A.L.R./Borum approach, they 
actually have modified it in practice. They appear to follow 
A.L.R./Borum only when questionable fingerprint evidence is 
the only evidence inculpating the defendant. In instances 
where additional evidence supports the conviction, these 
courts generally treat fingerprint evidence as they do other 
circumstantial evidence. They allow the trier of fact to 
determine the weight it is to be given. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236-37 (string citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the "second approach . . . and treat[ed] fingerprint evidence like any other piece 
of circumstantial evidence whether or not there is additional evidence." Id. at 237; State 
v. Moran. 699 A.2d 20, 23 (R.I. 1997) (conviction can rest entirely on circumstantial 
evidence). 
As this ruling establishes, a conviction will rarely, if ever, occur based solely on a 
single fingerprint. Other jurisdictions agree. See. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, 
Fingerprints. Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as Evidence. 28 A.L.R.2d 1115, §§ 28-30, 
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at 1154 (1953 & Supp. 2004); Monroe v. State. 652 A.2d 560, 564 (Del. 1995) (citing 
other jurisdictions). Like the decision in Hamilton, these courts conclude that "a 
conviction cannot be sustained solely on a defendant's fingerprint's being found on an 
object at a crime scene unless the State demonstrates that the prints could have been 
impressed only at the time the crime was committed." Monroe. 652 A.2d at 564; State v. 
Bridge, 955 P.2d 418,419 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). This approach applies with particular 
force when, as here, fingerprints are recovered from moveable objects. Bridge. 955 P.2d 
at 419. 
The State presented no evidence tying Mr. Quintana to the time of the crime. No 
one saw him near the burgled home. The police never recovered the stolen property or 
connected it to Mr. Quintana, at all. See. Monroe, 652 A.2d at 562, 567 (lone fingerprint 
insufficient to support guilt where police located none of the stolen goods). Further, the 
State presented no expert testimony on when the fingerprints had been placed. See 
MoraEU 699 A.2d at 23 (lack of expert testimony on durability of fingerprints supported 
insufficiency of the evidence). At best, the evidence only supports that Mr. Quintana 
touched the box in the Cannons' chest of drawers "at some time" during a 30-year period. 
State v. Mitchell, 506 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), (citing Hood v. State, 860 
S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)), affirmed on same grounds . 535 S.E.2d 126,127 
(S.C. 2000). Absent some connection to the time of the burglary, the jury's verdict was 
"'based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
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guilt.'" State v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), and State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 
1993)). 
The State erroneously contends that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the verdict supports a reasonable inference of guilt. State's Brief at 19. The State 
asserts that ff[n]o evidence suggested that defendant had access to the Cannon's home at 
any time other than when the burglary occurred." Id. at 20. But, this argument assumes 
that Mr. Quintana touched the box during the hour and-a-half while the Cannons were at 
church. 
This Court has conclusively ruled that the trier of fact may not infer guilt based on 
an "assumption." State v. Lavman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), affirmed, 
1999 UT 79,1[16, 985 P.2d 911. In Layman, for example, the appellant drove his father 
and his father's friend from Ogden to Vernal, Utah. Layman, 953 P.2d at 784. The 
father and the friend carried methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia with the intent to 
sell the drugs upon their arrival in Vernal. Id. Although the appellant drove and was 
under the influence of methamphetamine, there was no evidence connecting him with his 
father's and the friend's plan to possess and distribute drugs. Id. Following a bench 
trial, the trial judge convicted the appellant of possessing drugs with intent to distribute. 
Id at 785. 
This Court ruled that the circumstantial "evidence and all reasonable inferences 
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therefrom, even viewed in a light most favorable to the State,f! failed to support guilt. Id. 
at 790. Because the convictions lfrest[ed] on a fundamental assumption for which the 
record contains no evidence^] that assumption [] allowed the court 'to indulge an 
inference upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture not justifying a conclusion 
that [possession had been proven] beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . ' " Id . at 787 (quoting 
State v. George, 481 P.2d 667, 667 (1971)). Although, in making its decision, this Court 
erroneously relied on the discredited requirement to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence, the Utah Supreme Court upheld this Court's conclusion on the inadequacy 
of the evidence on certiorari review. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ [16, 985 P.2d 911. 
In this case, the State similarly assumes that Mr. Quintana touched the box at the 
time the crime took place. This assumption resulted in the State resorting to indulging in 
"inference upon inference" to connect Mr. Quintana to the fingerprint. Lyman, 966 P.2d 
at 282 n.3. But, the State produced no evidence that even hinted that Mr. Quintana 
entered or was even near the Cannons' home during the relevant time frame. Because 
the State can only assume that Mr. Quintana placed the fingerprint on the box "at the 
time the crime was committed," the evidence ff'give[s] rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt.'" Monroe. 652 A.2d at 564; Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281; (quoting 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 344, and Workman, 852 P.2d at 985). 
The State's reliance on viewing the evidence most favorably to the jury's verdicts 
also effectively shifts to the defense the burden of connecting Mr. Quintana to the time 
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that the crime occurred. Mr. Quintana had "no obligation to offer a credible, lawful 
explanation for the existence of his . . . fingerprints on the" box. Monroe . 652 A.2d at 
565. Rather, the State had to prove that "the prints could have been impressed only at the 
time the crime was committed." Id. at 564. In the absence of any connection, the State's 
case was "'based on pure speculation.'" Bridge, 955 P.2d at 419 (quoting Mikes v. Borg. 
947 P.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied 505 U.S. 1229 (1992)). Accordingly, the 
lone fingerprint provided inadequate circumstantial evidence of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 236-37. 
III. BECAUSE INTENT WAS DISPUTED AND THE 
EVIDENCE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENSE 
THEORY, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE OF 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
Even if the fingerprint evidence was admissible and the State presented sufficient 
evidence of guilt, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of criminal trespass. The State asserts that no instruction was needed 
because "there was no evidence to suggest that the defendant entered a property 
intending to do anything other than commit a theft." State's Brief at 23. But, the cases 
the State cites do not apply here because, unlike this case, the evidence in those cases 
raised no ambiguities about the defendants' actions or intent. 
In three of the State's cases, the prosecution presented eyewitness testimony that 
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the defendant actually took the stolen items and intended to steal them. State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (witness saw defendant carrying jewelry and firearms out 
of burgled house); State v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1983) (defendant caught in 
the act of breaking into a hotel room); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 663 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (witness saw defendant with stolen items in hand). Here, there was no such 
evidence of an intent to commit theft not only because the State failed to connect Mr. 
Quintana to the time of the crime, but the State presented absolutely no other evidence 
connecting him to the crime scene, at all. Rather, the evidence in this case was 
"ambiguous [and] subject to [] alternative interpretation that required the [trial] court to 
instruct on a lesser offense." State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) 
Further, Baker does not apply because the defendant in that case did not dispute 
the alleged act. Rather, he argued that he was too intoxicated to form the necessary 
intent. 671 P.2d at 159. In contrast, Mr. Quintana has never admitted entering the 
Cannons' home at the time of the burglary nor does he raise an affirmative defense. 
Instead, he contends that the evidence was "ambiguous or subject to [] alternative 
interpretation" because he could have entered the home on a different occasion during a 
30-year period without any intent to commit a theft. IcL 
As opposed to the State's cases, State v. Knight. 2003 UT App 354, 79 P.3d 969, 
directly applies to this appeal. Mr. Quintana's claim that he could have entered the 
Cannons' home anytime during a 30-year period rationally supports a simple trespass. 
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Id. at T|16. Trial judges must instruct the jury on lesser offenses when the "evidence is 
consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of the case." IcL. at ^ J17. 
Instructing on the lesser crime is "especially necessary when intent is in dispute" as it is 
in this case. Id. at ^ [16 n.3, [^17. Because the State cannot show when Mr. Quintana had 
entered the Cannons' home, the evidence is equally consistent with a trespass as it is with 
burglary with intent to commit theft. The trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on Mr. 
Quintana's theory "undermined" the jury's verdict and, therefore, requires reversal and a 
new trial. Id. at^[17. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Quintana requests this Court to reverse his convictions for burglary and theft 
because the trial judge admitted unreliable fingerprint evidence and that evidence served 
as the only evidence of guilt. In any event, the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
of guilt. At the very least, this Court should grant Mr. Quintana a new trial because the 
trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. 
Dated this }g*_ day of April, 2004. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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